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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kenneth Randall Smith appeals from the district court's judgments in 
separate cases. In the first he that the district court erred when it denied 
his motion to suppress. In the he 
it denied his motion to suppress, and that it abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion in limine and permitted the State to impeach his credibility with his prior 
conviction for burglary. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A. The Possession Case 
Officer Patrick Cwik of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department testified that he 
conducted a traffic stop in the early morning hours on a car after the driver, Mr. Smith, 
failed to use his turn signal. (Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.8, Ls.3-10, p.11, Ls.4-17.)1 The officer 
saw a baton and a hatchet inside the car, and had Mr. Smith step outside. (Tr., Mar. 4, 
2013, p.13, L.21 -p.15, L.15.) When the officer checked with dispatch, he learned that 
Mr. Smith had alerts for assault on an officer and other offenses. (Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, 
p.18, Ls.13-18.) At some point during the incident, Officer Sterling came on the scene 
in response to Officer Cwik's request. (Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.18, L.25 - p.19, L.5.) 
Mr. Smith had set down his jacket on the trunk of the car next to him, and Officer Cwik 
patted down the jacket and found a sock with a hard rectangular object inside. 
(Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.16, Ls.9-12, p.21, L.3 - p.23, L.18.) From the sock, the officer 
removed a canister which had syringes, cotton balls, and a clear plastic bag with a white 
residue inside. (Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.24, L.10 - p.26, L.8.) 
1 
Officer Cwik questioned Mr. Smith without reading him his Miranda rights, 2 and 
Mr. Smith stated that the items were his. (Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.31, Ls.4-·14; see 
Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.66, L.14.) The officers did not arrest Mr. Smith or issue a traffic 
citation, but Officer Cwik seized the contents of the canister as evidence, cited 
Mr. Smith for possession of drug paraphernalia, and released him. (Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, 
p.32, Ls.6-12, p.54, Ls.20-23.) A later test on the white residue in the plastic bag 
showed that the residue contained methamphetamine. (40996 R., p.8.)3 
In Kootenai County No. CR 2012-19901 (hereinafter, the possession case), the 
State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. Smith had committed the offense of 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine ), felony, in violation of Idaho 
Code§ 37-2732(c)(1 ). (40996 R., pp.7-8.) After a preliminary hearing, the district court 
found probable cause and bound Mr. Smith over to the district court. (40996 R., pp.26-
30.) Mr. Smith entered a written not guilty plea to the charge. (40996 R., pp.31-33.) 
The State then filed an Information charging Mr. Smith with the above offense. (40996 
R., pp.34-35.) 
Mr. Smith subsequently filed a Motion to Suppress, requesting that the district 
court suppress all evidence gathered during the traffic stop because the officer did not 
have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct a traffic stop, in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United State Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
1 All page references to "Tr." cite to the volumes of the transcript on appeal lodged with 
the Idaho Supreme Court under Supreme Court Docket Nos. 40996 and 41661. 
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3 All page references to "40996 R." cite to the 170-page PDF version of the record. 
2 
Constitution. (40996 R., pp.40-43.) Mr. Smith filed a Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Suppress, asserting that the questioning and search unlawfully extended his 
warantless detention, he was subject to an unlawful frisk, Officer Cwik illegally 
exceeded the scope of the frisk for weapons, and his statements to the officer were 
elicited in violation of his fiAiranda rights. (40996 R., pp.56-70.) The State filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (40996 R., pp.50-55.) 
At the motion to suppress hearing, the district court heard testimony from 
Officer Cwik, and then gave the parties time to submit supplemental briefing. (40996 
R., pp. 71-76.) Mr. Smith then filed a Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress. 
(40996 R., pp.77-82.) In its subsequent decision, the district court found that the stop 
was lawful for failure to signal, there was no prolonging of the stop, the totality of the 
circumstances was sufficient to perform a Terry frisk,4 and Mr. Smith was not in custody 
for purposes of Miranda when he was questioned. (40996 R., pp.82-84.) Thus, the 
district court entered an order denying the motion to suppress. (40996 R., pp.120-21.) 
The State then filed an Amended Information charging Mr. Smith with possession 
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and alleging that he was a persistent 
violator under I.C. § 19-2514. (40996 R., pp.89-90.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Smith pleaded guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine). (40996 R., p.106.) The State agreed to run 
any sentence in the possession case concurrent with Mr. Smith's sentence in his other 
case, and to dismiss the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (40996 
R., p.106). The plea would be conditional and allow Mr. Smith to appeal the denial of 
4 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
3 
the motion to suppress. (40996 , pp.1 1 ) The district 
Mr. Smith's guilty plea. (40996 R., p.106.) 
8. The Aggravated Assault Case 
About a month after the traffic stop in the possession case, Mr. Smith was trying 
to defuse a series of bad situations. ( See, , Tr., Oct. 2013, , Ls.16-24, 
p.228, L.19 p.229, L.6.)5 Mr. Smith testified that he drove an acquaintance to an 
apartment complex, but the acquaintance did not give Mr. Smith gas money for driving 
him around as promised, and the people they visited inside an apartment had been 
using methamphetamine and heroin. (Tr., Oct. 2013, p.209, Ls.1 p.210, Ls.3-
24, p.211, Ls.9-23; see Tr., Oct. 2013, p.240, ) Mr. Smith testified that he 
been sober for eight days, and he became upset at the situation, smacked the 
acquaintance twice, and decided to leave the apartment to avoid a further altercation. 
(Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.241, Ls.2-4; see Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.211, L.10-p.212, L.18.) 
Mr. Smith tried to leave in his car, but a truck was parked in his way. (Tr., Oct. 2, 
2013, p.212, L.24 - p.213, L.8.) A crowd of people were in the apartment complex 
parking lot, partying and drinking. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.213, Ls.9-14, p.254, L.17 -
p.255, L.5.) Mr. Smith got out of his car because he had just left a hostile environment 
and was frustrated and running out of gas. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.213, Ls.18-24.) He 
tried to ask the crowd whose truck was blocking him, but Tristina Pichotta then yelled at 
him and ran into him. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.214, L.10 - p.215, L.13.) Mr. Smith had 
cursed in frustration at being blocked, and Ms. Pichotta yelled that she thought that 
5 All page references to 'Tr., Oct. 1" or "Tr., Oct. 2" cite to those parts of the trial 
transcript contained in the 349-page volume of the transcript on appeal, which does not 
include voir dire or the parties' opening statements and closing arguments. Vair dire, 
opening statements, and closing arguments are contained in a separate 102-page 
volume. 
4 
Mr. Smith had called someone in the crowd ·'a B word." (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.2·13, Ls.19-
21, p.215, Ls.2-3, p.246, L.18 - p.247, L.2.) After she ran into Mr. Smith, Ms. Pichotta 
continued yelling at him, and he heard someone else state they were calling the police. 
(Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.215, Ls.14-19.) He got back into his car, and someone from the 
crowd hit him with a thrown sandal. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.216, Ls.4-22.) Mr. Smith 
eventually pulled out of the parking lot by going the other way and leaving through the 
entrance. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.217, Ls.11-20.) 
Mr. Smith testified that, after leaving the bad situation at the apartment complex 
parking lot, he tried to drive to get gas at the closest possible place and get his car 
someplace safe. (See Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.2·1?, L.21 - p.218, L.11.) Mr. Smith did not 
have much gas left in his car, and his car's steering and brakes were hard to operate 
when the car was low on gas. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.218, L.12- p.219, L.16.) Before he 
reached the nearest open gas station, the car stalled out and its motor stopped. 
(Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.219, L.17 - p.222, L.6.) 
Mr. Smith tried to drive the car back and forth from one side of the street to the 
other to maintain momentum, but he eventually parked on the side of the road. 
(Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.221, L.8 - p.222, L.11.) He did not have a nozzle for his gas can, 
so he left the car, grabbed a pop bottle and a knife,6 and tried to make a funnel for the 
gas can. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.222, L.13- p.223, L.13.) Thomas Moorhouse then yelled 
at Mr. Smith for taking his parking space and stated that he was going to call the police. 
(Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.223, L.13 - p.224, L.3, p.261, Ls.18-19.) In frustration, Mr. Smith 
yelled back, "Why? What did I do to you?" (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.261, Ls.16-20, p.268, 
6 Mr. Smith's blade was described as a "knife" (e.g., Tr., Oct. 2, p.225, Ls.14-18), and as 
a "machete" (e.g., Tr., Oct. 1, 2013, p.114, L.21 - p.115, L.9). The blade is perhaps 
most accurately described as a kukri, a Nepali knife. (See Tr., Oct. 1, p.162, Ls.3-9.) 
5 
Ls.13-·16.) To Mr. Smith, "it seemed like everywhere I went, the more I tried to get away 
from it, the worse it got." (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.268, Ls.20-22.) 
Mr. Smith testified that after he explained that he was out of gas, Mr. Moorhouse 
became more civil and offered to help, before going out of Mr. Smith's sight. 
(Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.225, L.6 p.226, L.11.) Mr. Moorhouse had told Mr. Smith to go to 
the front of Mr. Moorhouse's vehicle, but when Mr. Smith got there, the other occupant 
of that vehicle showed Mr. Smith that Mr. Moorhouse was standing in a nearby yard. 
(Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.227, Ls.15-24.) Mr. Moorhouse threw his phone on the grass and 
stated that he would not be calling the police, and Mr. Smith realized that 
Mr. Moorhouse was reacting to the knife still in Mr. Smith's hand. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, 
p.227, L.24 - p.228, L.14.) Mr. Smith then went back to his car. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, 
p.228, Ls.15-18.) 
The occupants of a white SUV, Alicia Sullivan and Brad Brumbaugh, then called 
Mr. Smith over to the SUV and asked him what was going on with Mr. Moorhouse. (See 
Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.226, L.15 - p.227, L.2.) The SUV occupants stated they were there 
to help, and Mr. Smith asked if he could get a ride to the gas station. {Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, 
p.227, Ls.3-7.) He went to his car to get his gas can, reconsidered asking for a ride 
because the gas station was only two blocks away, and "started thinking that maybe I 
could give these guys this - the knife to get it out of the situation, to kind of defuse the 
situation." (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.228, L.21 - p.229, L.6.) He then attempted to give the 
SUV occupants the knife. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.229, Ls.7-9.) But when he offered them 
the knife, Ms. Sullivan panicked and Mr. Brumbaugh went to grab the knife. ( See 
Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.230, Ls.3-11.) Mr. Smith pulled the knife back because it looked like 
Mr. Brumbaugh was going to cut himself. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.230, Ls.11-13.) 
6 
Mr. Smith testified that he did not poke or threaten Mr. Brumbaugh or 
Mr. Moorhouse with the knife, and that he did not point the knife at them. (Tr., Oct. 2, 
2013, p.230, Ls.14-24.) After he pulled the knife back, Mr. Smith stated, "What the F 
are you doing?" because he figured that Mr. Brumbaugh was going to cut himself. 
(Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.230, L.25 - p.231, L.7.) He thought that they did not realize that the 
knife was a gift. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.277, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Brumbaugh and Ms. Sullivan 
then drove off. (See Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.231, Ls.8-9.) 
Mr. Smith testified that he then began to panic: "I felt like everything just kept 
going wrong and worse." (Tr., Oct. 2, 20·13, p.277, L.15 ·- p.278, L.10.) He went back 
to his car and then walked to a nearby trailer, where another of his acquaintances 
handed him a bicycle and told him to "Go." (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.231, L.10 - p.233, L.6.) 
With the knife in hand, he then rode the bicycle through an adjacent parking lot, before 
almost running into a police car. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.233, L.7 - p.234, L.8.) Mr. Smith 
then rode to another parking lot and threw the knife underneath a dumpster. 
(Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.234, Ls.7-21.) The police chased him on the bike for about a block 
and a half, and then Mr. Smith got off the bike and the police used a Taser on him. 
(Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.284, L.24 - p.285, L.5; see Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.234, L.22 - p.235, 
L.1.) 
Ms. Pichotta and her sister Sarah Ferguson testified that Mr. Smith shoved or 
pushed them both with his chest. (Tr., Oct. 1, 2013, p.83, L.7 - p.91, L.18, p.97, L.3 -
p.102, L.18.) Mr. Brumbaugh and his wife, Ms. Sullivan, testified that Mr. Smith stuck a 
machete against Mr. Brumbaugh's neck, leaving a mark. (Tr., Oct. 1, 2013, p.107, L.22 
- p.108, L.8, p.114, L.21 - p.118, L.18, p.129, L.11 - p.130, L.1, p.131, L.25 - p.132, 
L.9.) Mr. Brumbaugh, Ms. Sullivan, and Mr. Moorhouse testified that Mr. Smith 
7 
subsequently chased Mr. Moorhouse around Mr. Moorhouse's parked vehicle with the 
knife. (Tr., Oct. ·1, 2013, p.117, Ls.4-13, p.133, L.19-p.134, L.7, p.145, Ls.9-17, p.149, 
L.17 -·- p:151, L.21.) Mr. Brumbaugh later received a tetanus shot. (Tr., Oct 1, 2013, 
p.136, Ls.11-14.) 
Officer Winston Brooks of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department testified that he 
had followed Mr. Smith, who was on a bicycle and matched the description given to him 
by dispatch, before Mr. Smith was taken into custody. (Tr., Oct. 1, 2013, p.168, L.16 
p.172, L.8.) According to Officer Brooks, Mr. Smith was very agitated, hostile, and 
aggressive. (Tr., Oct. ·1, 2013, p.172, Ls.13-18.) During Mr. Smith's arrest, officers 
reportedly found a black pouch on his belt containing a syringe. (4166·1 R., p.14.)7 
After being placed in the patrol car, Mr. Smith reportedly chewed on the inside door of 
the patrol car. (41661 R., p.14.) Officer Brooks then transported Mr. Smith to a hospital 
for an involuntary blood draw. (Tr., Oct. 1, 2013, p.172, L.22 - p.173, L.2; see 41661 
R., pp.14-16.) The blood draw was done without a warrant. (See Tr., May 31, 2013, 
p.40, Ls.5-9.) The blood sample taken from Mr. Smith later tested positive for the 
presence of methamphetamine. (Tr., Oct. 1, 2013, p.183, L.25 - p.186, L.8.) 
In Kootenai County No. CR 2012-17350 (hereinafter, the aggravated assault 
case), the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. Smith had committed the 
offense of aggravated assault, felony (in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-901, 18-905 and 
19-2514) upon Mr. Moorhouse, and the offense of aggravated battery, felony (in 
violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-903, 18-907, 19-2514) upon Mr. Brumbaugh. (41661 
R., pp.64-65.) The Criminal Complaint further alleged that Mr. Smith had used a deadly 
weapon in the commission of a felony, and that he was a persistent violator under 
7 All page references to "41661 R." cite to the 389-page PDF version of the record. 
8 
I.C. § 19-2514. (41661 R., pp.65-66.) The magistrate then consolidated the aggravated 
assault case with three citations where Mr. Smith had been charged with misdemeanor 
driving under the influence, two counts of misdemeanor battery (upon, respectively, 
Ms. Ferguson and Ms. Pischotta), misdemeanor malicious injury to property, 
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and misdemeanor resisting or 
obstructing officers. (41661 R., pp.72-73; see 41661 R., pp.82, 93-94.) After a 
preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause and bound Mr. Smith over to 
the district court. (41661 R., pp.79-82.) Mr. Smith entered a written not guilty plea to all 
of the charges. (41661 R., pp.93-96.) The State then filed an Information charging 
Mr. Smith with the above eight counts. (41661 R., pp.97-101.) 
Mr. Smith later filed a Motion In Limine, requesting that the district court exclude 
any testimony during trial relating to his criminal convictions pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404(b), exclude examination of Mr. Smith on his 2000 Washington State 
conviction for first degree burglary pursuant to Rule 609, exclude any testimony or 
evidence regarding the alleged paraphernalia (syringe) found during Mr. Smith's arrest, 
and exclude any testimony of evidence relating to the laboratory testing of Mr. Smith's 
blood taken during a forcible blood draw. (See 41661 R., pp.142-44.) 
At the motion in limine hearing, the State explained that it did not intend to bring 
in the prior convictions, outside the conviction for burglary if Mr. Smith testified. (41661 
R., p.157; see Tr., May 13, 2013, p.20, Ls.16-21.) The district court granted the motion 
in limine with respect to the 404(b) evidence. (41661 R., p.167.) The district court 
denied the motion in limine with respect to the burglary conviction, because the 
conviction weighed on Mr. Smith's credibility. (41661 R., pp.158, 167.) The district 
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court decided that the drug paraphernalia and blood draw issues were premature, and 
denied the rest of the motion in limine without prejudice. (41661 R., pp:158, 167.) 
Mr. Smith then filed a Motion to Suppress, requesting the suppression of any 
testimony or evidence relating to the laboratory testing of Mr. Smith's blood taken in a 
forcible blood draw. (41661 R., pp.160-63.) The State filed a Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (41661 R., pp.169-75.) Mr. Smith filed a Reply Brief 
in Support of Motion to Suppress. (41661 R., pp.177-82.) The district court, based on 
Idaho case law, denied the motion to suppress. (41661 R., pp.183-86.) 
About two weeks before Mr. Smith's scheduled jury trial, he entered guilty pleas 
to the misdemeanor malicious injury to property, possession of drug paraphernalia, and 
resisting or obstructing officers charges. (41661 R., p.231; see 41661 R., pp.232-36.) 
The district court accepted those guilty pleas. (41661 R., p.231.) The district court then 
stated that the jury would hear the aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and driving 
under the influence charges, as well as the two battery charges that the district court 
had previously severed. (41661 R., p.231; see 41661 R., pp.232-24.) 
The aggravated assault case proceeded to a two-day jury trial, where Mr. Smith 
and the other involved parties gave their testimony. (41661 R., pp.247-73.) The jury 
found Mr. Smith guilty of the aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and driving under 
the influence counts. (41661 R., pp.317-18.) The jury found Mr. Smith not guilty of the 
two counts of battery. (41661 R., p.318.) 
C. Sentencing In Both Cases 
The district court held a combined sentencing hearing for the possession case 
and the aggravated assault case. (41661 R., pp.329-30.) The State recommended that 
the district court impose a unified sentence of five years fixed in the possession case. 
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(4"166·1 R., p.329.) The State also recommended that the district court impose a 
concurrent unified sentence of twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed, on both the 
aggravated assault and the aggravated battery charges in the aggravated assault case. 
(4·1661 R., p.329.) Mr. Smith recommended that the district court consider retaining 
jurisdiction and placing him on a "rider." (41661 R., p.329.) As for the underlying 
sentences, he recommended a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed. 
(41661 R., p.329.) 
In the possession case, the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years 
fixed. (41661 R., pp.330-336.) In the aggravated assault case, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of twenty-three years, with eight years fixed, on both the 
aggravated assault and the aggravated battery charges. (41661 R., pp.330-32.) The 
sentences would run concurrently. 8 (41661 R., pp.330, 332.) 
In the aggravated assault case, Mr. Smith filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the 
district court's Judgment and Sentence. (41661 R., pp.345-49.) He also filed an 
Amended Notice of Appeal in the possession case.9 (40996 R., pp.139-43.) 
8 For the malicious injury to property charge, the district court imposed a sentence of 
180 days jail time, with credit for 180 days. (41661 R., p.339.) For the possession of 
drug paraphernalia charge, the district court imposed a sentence of 365 days jail time, 
with credit for 365 days. (41661 R., p.338.) For the resisting and obstructing officers 
charge, the district court imposed a sentence of 180 days jail time, with credit for 180 
days. (41661 R., p.337.) For the driving under the influence charge, the district court 
imposed a sentence of 180 days jail time, with credit for 180 days. (41661 R., p.342.) 
9 In the possession case, Mr. Smith had filed a Notice of Appeal after the denial of the 
motion to suppress, in Supreme Court Docket No. 40996. (See 40996 R., pp.111-14.) 
While the filing of that Notice of Appeal was not appropriate, the Idaho Supreme Court 
ordered that the Amended Notice of Appeal in the possession case be considered in 
Supreme Court Docket No. 41661, the appeal in the aggravated assault case.9 (See 
40996 R., p.160.) 
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Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Smith's motion to suppress in the 
aggravated assault case? 
Did the district court abuse discretion when it denied Mr. motion in 
limine in the aggravated assault case and permitted the State to impeach his 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Smith's Motion To Suppress In The 
Possession Case 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Smith that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress in the possession case. The traffic stop was unlawfully extended. Officer 
Cwik's Terry frisk of Mr. Smith's jacket was unlawful, and even if the Terry frisk of the 
jacket were valid, the removal of the canister from the sock exceeded the of the 
Terry frisk. Mr. Smith was not given Miranda warnings despite being in custody, and his 
during the traffic stop in to Officer's Cwik's questioning about the 
items in the should therefore suppressed. 
Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, an 
appellate court defers to the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, 
and exercises free review over the district court's determination as to whether 
constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. 
Donato, 135 Idaho 469,470 (2001). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
17 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. A search or seizure 
conducted without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable. State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 
835, 837-38 (2004). To overcome the presumption, the State bears the burden of 
showing that (1) the warrantless search or seizure fell within a well-recognized 
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exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) the search or seizure was reasonable in 
light of all of the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 838. 
Traffic stops, a form of limited investigatory detention, are seizures for purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); State v. 
Bishop, 146 !daho 804, 810 (2009) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. ·1, ·19 (1968)). Thus, 
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement applies to traffic stops. See 
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. 
Generally, a seizure must be based on probable cause to be reasonable. Id. 
However, a limited investigatory detention, based on less than probable cause, is 
"permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person 
has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." Id. (citing Florida v. f~oyer, 460 U.S. 
491 , 498 ( 1983) ). "Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts 
and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts." Id. While the quantity 
and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that 
necessary to establish probable cause, reasonable suspicion "requires more than a 
mere hunch or 'inchoate or unparticularized suspicion."' Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 
496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). "Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is 
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before 
the time of the stop." Id. 
"To meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness, an investigative 
detention must not only be justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, but also 
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the 
first place." State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003). However, 
[a]ny routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious circumstances which 
could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. The 
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officer's observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop 
may-and often do-give rise to legitimate reasons for particularized lines 
of inquiry and further investigation by an officer. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "the length and scope of the stop may be 
lawfully expanded if the detaining officer can 'point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion."' Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ). 
C. The Traffic Stop Was Unlawfully Extended 
Mr. Smith asserts that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended, because the 
officers abandoned the original reason for the traffic stop by investigating a suspected 
DUI instead of the initial traffic violation. The district court determined that the stop was 
not illegally prolonged, primarily because Mr. Smith, after giving Officer Cwik his expired 
temporary license, gave the officer permission to search the car for Mr. Smith's valid 
driver's license and proof of insurance. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.63, Ls.5-19.) However, 
the traffic stop was actually unlawfully extended. 
Mr. Smith concedes that the traffic stop of the vehicle for failure to signal was 
valid at its inception. See I.C. § 49-808(1 ); State v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277, 279 (Ct. 
App. 1998). A traffic violation, as an unlawful activity, in itself justifies a traffic stop. 
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998). 
Nonetheless, the traffic stop was unlawfully extended, such that it was not 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first 
place." See Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983. While Mr. Smith gave Officer Cwik permission 
to search the car for the driver's license and proof of insurance (see Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, 
p.63, Ls.5-13), once the officer began looking into a suspected DUI (see Tr., Mar. 4, 
2013, p.31, L.4 - p.32, L.8), he abandoned the original purpose for the traffic stop. See 
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State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 564 (Ct. App. 2005); see also State v. Gutierrez, 137 
Idaho 647, 651-53 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that once an officer accomplished the 
purpose of a traffic stop by issuing a warning, his continued detention to question the 
occupants of a car about drugs, alcohol, and weapons was "an unwarranted intrusion 
upon the vehicle's occupants' privacy and liberty"). 
Officer Cwik indicated that he had abandoned the original purpose for the traffic 
stop when he did not direct Officer Sterling to conduct a concurrent investigation into the 
traffic offense (see Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.27, Ls.2-17), after the other officer arrived at the 
scene. See Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 564 ("At any rate it is clear that the officers did not 
delegate among themselves responsibility for concurrent investigations-one aimed at 
resolution of the traffic offense, one aimed at officer safety concerns, and another aimed 
at drug interdiction.") The officers here did not even issue a traffic citation (Tr., Mar. 4, 
2013, p.54, Ls.20-23), further demonstrating that the original purpose for the traffic stop 
had been abandoned. Cf. Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 564 ("Aguirre did eventually receive a 
traffic citation, but not until after he had been arrested and transported to jail on the 
weapons offense."). 
Because the officers abandoned the original purpose for the traffic stop, the 
traffic stop became no longer reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the stop at its inception. See id. Thus, the traffic stop was unlawfully extended. 
See id. The district court should have granted Mr. Smith's motion to suppress. 
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D. Officer Cwik's Terry Frisk Of Mr. Smith's Jacket Was Unlawful, And Even If The 
Terry Frisk Of The Jacket Were Valid, The Removal Of The Canister From The 
Sock Exceeded The Scope Of The Terry Frisk 
Mr. Smith asserts that Officer Cwik's frisk of Mr. Smith's jacket was 
unlawful, and even if the Teny frisk of the jacket were valid, the removal of the canister 
the the Terry frisk. 
Generally, to be reasonable a search must be authorized by a warrant that is 
based on probable cause, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. 
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 818 (2009). One exception to the warrant requirement 
is the pat-down search for weapons recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 
Terry v. Ohio, U 1 (1968), the "Terry frisk." Bishop, 146 Idaho 818. "Under 
Terry, an officer may conduct a limited pat-down search, or frisk, 'of outer 
of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons."' Id. 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16). 
The district court found that Officer Cwik's Terry frisk of the jacket and the 
removal of the canister from the sock were justified. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.66, Ls.9-12.) 
According to the district court's findings of fact, during the traffic stop, Officer Cwik saw 
items in the vehicle which could be used as weapons. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.63, L.24 -
p.64, L.1.) When the officer checked with dispatch, he received alerts that Mr. Smith 
had allegedly committed assault on an officer and other offenses. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, 
p.66, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Smith had removed his jacket and placed it on the trunk of the car 
within his reach. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.64, Ls.6-9.) Officer Cwik patted down the jacket 
and felt something. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.64, L.10.) He asked Mr. Smith for consent to 
search the jacket, but Mr. Smith did not give his permission. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.64, 
Ls.10-15.) When asked about the item in the jacket, Mr. Smith gave conflicting 
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responses as to what it was. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.64, Ls.16-18.) When it appeared 
that Officer Cwik intended to search the jacket, Mr. Smith lunged at the officer and 
became somewhat aggressive. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.64, Ls.18-22.) 
Officer Cwik then searched the jacket and found an item in a sock, which 
indicated to the officer "that it could be a weapon." (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.64, Ls.23-25.) 
He shook the sock to remove the item. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.64, L.25 - p.65, L.1.) The 
unsecured canister came out of the sock and spilled its contents. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, 
p.65, Ls.1-2.) The district court found, under the totality of the circumstances, that the 
Terry frisk of the jacket and subsequent removal of the canister from the sock were 
justified. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.66, Ls.9-12.) However, the Terry frisk of the jacket was 
not justified. 
Idaho's appellate courts have used the Terry frisk analysis to determine whether 
a search of a person's effects not on their body during a limited investigatory stop was 
reasonable. E.g., State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73 (2000) (finding that the search of a 
detainee's purse during a traffic stop was reasonable and lawful under Terry). A Terry 
frisk is justified only when, "at the moment of the frisk, the officer has reason to believe 
that the individual he or she is investigating is 'armed and presently dangerous to the 
officer or to others' and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter dispels the officer's 
belief." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 30). "The test is an 
objective one that asks whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably 
prudent person would be justified in concluding that the individual posed a risk of 
danger." Id. To meet the test, "the officer must indicate specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, in light of his or her 
experience, justify the officer's suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous." 
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Id. at 818-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Although an officer need not possess 
absolute certainty that an individual is armed and dangerous, an officer's inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not enough to justify a frisk." Id. at 819 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court also stated in Bishop that: 
Several factors influence whether a reasonable person in the officer's 
position would conclude that a particular person was armed and 
dangerous. These factors include: whether there were any bulges in the 
suspect's clothing that resembled a weapon; whether the encounter took 
place late at night or in a high crime area; and whether the individual 
made threatening or furtive movements, indicated that he or she 
possessed a weapon, appeared nervous or agitated, appeared to be 
under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, was unwilling to cooperate, 
or had a reputation for being dangerous. Whether any of these 
considerations, taken together or by themselves, are enough to justify a 
Terry frisk depends on an analysis of the totality of the circumstances. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "For a frisk to be held constitutional, an officer 
must demonstrate how the facts he or she relied on in conducting the frisk support the 
conclusion that the suspect posed a risk of danger." Id. 
A Terry frisk is of limited scope. A Terry frisk "must be strictly limited to that 
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the 
officer or others nearby." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). "If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to 
determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be 
suppressed." Id. (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968)). 
Under the Terry frisk analysis, Officer Cwik did not have reasonable suspicion to 
believe that Mr. Smith was armed and dangerous. The district court weighed the 
following factors when it determined that the Terry frisk was justified: 
(1) The traffic stop was late at night; 
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(2) The officer observed items in the car which were characterized by the 
officer as capable of being used as weapons; 
(3) The traffic stop was not in a high crime area; 
(4) Mr. Smith made threatening acts in lunging at the officer and 
showing agitation; 
(5) Mr. Smith thereby showed a level of unwillingness to cooperate; 
(6) The officer knew that Mr. Smith had alerts for violent offenses, including 
assault on an officer. 
(Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.65, L.23- p.66, L.8; see Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.18, Ls.13-18.) 
Mr. Smith submits that Officer Cwik, in light of the above factors, did not have 
reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances to believe that Mr. Smith 
was armed and dangerous. See State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655 (2006) (holding that 
although a defendant possessed a knife, an officer's Terry frisk of the defendant was 
not justified because the facts did not support a reasonable suspicion that the defendant 
was dangerous). Thus, the officer's Terry frisk of the jacket was not justified. 
Even if the officer's Terry frisk of the jacket were justified, the removal of the 
canister from the sock went beyond the limited scope of a Terry frisk. Because the sock 
was in the officer's possession, it was not necessary to further examine it or remove its 
contents to discover weapons which might have been used to harm the officer. See 
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373. Thus, the Terry frisk went "beyond what is necessary to 
determine if [Mr. Smith] is armed," and was therefore "no longer valid under Terry." See 
id.; see also State v. Johnson, 270 P.3d 1135, 1141 (Kan. 2012) ("Once [the officer] 
secured the pack of cigarettes, any nonhysterical threat its contents may have posed 
was eliminated and no further search was permitted."). 
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The circumstances here are similar to those in State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728 
(Ct. App. 2005). In Faith, officers performed a Terry frisk on the defendant, found an 
Altoids mint tin on the defendant's person, removed the Altoids tin, and opened the 
Altoids tin to find methamphetamine residue and drug paraphernalia inside. Id. at 729. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the removal of the Altoids tin violated the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, because "[a]fter satisfying themselves that the 
item was a container and not a weapon ... the officers had no valid reason to further 
invade [the defendant's] right to be free of police instruction absent reasonable cause to 
arrest him." Id. at 730. 
The Faith Court further concluded "that even if the officers were justified in 
removing the tin for their own protection or to prevent the suspect from escaping, once 
the container was in the officers' possession, the officers no longer had reason to 
believe that it posed a threat to them in either respect." Id. "If the officers thought that 
the Altoids box contained a razor blade or knife that could be used as a weapon or a 
means of escape, the officers simply could have withheld the tin from [the defendant]." 
Id. Thus, the Court held that "[t]he opening of the box and inspection of its contents was 
unlawful. ... [T]he opening of the container after its seizure by the officers also violated 
[the defendant's] Fourth Amendment rights." Id. at 730-31. 
The removal of the canister from the sock in this case was unlawful because it 
was outside the scope of the Terry frisk of the jacket. The removal of the canister from 
the sock is analogous to the opening of the Altoids tin in Faith. Once the sock was in 
Officer's Cwik's possession, he no longer had reason to believe that it posed a threat. 
See Faith, 141 Idaho at 730. If the Officer Cwik thought that the sock was a weapon or 
contained something that could be used as a weapon, he simply could have withheld 
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the sock from Mr. Smith. See id. The Faith decision therefore cuts against the officer's 
proffered rationale that he was rendering the item safe by removing the container from 
the sock (see Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.24, Ls.10-21 ), because the officer could have 
rendered the item safe by keeping it in the officer's possession (and away from 
Mr. Smith). See Faith, 141 Idaho at 730. Thus, even assuming Officer Cwik were 
justified in his Teny frisk of the jacket, the removal of the canister from the sock was 
outside the scope of the Terry frisk and therefore unlawful. 
In sum, Officer Cwik's Terry frisk of the jacket was not justified. Even assuming 
the Terry frisk of the jacket were justified, the removal of the canister from the sock was 
outside the scope of the Terry frisk and therefore unlawful. Thus, the district court 
should have granted Mr. Smith's motion to suppress. 
E. Because Mr. Smith Was Not Given Miranda Warnings Despite Being In Custody, 
His Statements In Response To Officer Cwik's Questioning About The Items In 
The Canister Should Be Suppressed 
Mr. Smith asserts that, because he was not given Miranda warnings despite 
being in custody, his statements in response to Officer's Cwik's questioning about the 
items in the canister should be suppressed. 
The district court found that there was no Miranda violation. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, 
p.68, Ls.7-8.) The district court noted that "[n]o statements were identified to me that 
the defense wishes to have suppressed." (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.66, Ls.14-16.) 
However, the district court essentially determined that the statements at issue were the 
statements given by Mr. Smith in response to Officer Cwik's questioning about the items 
in the canister. (See Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.67, Ls.6-8.) Officer Cwik testified that he 
questioned Mr. Smith about the items found in the canister. (See Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, 
p.31, Ls.4-9.) Mr. Smith stated that the items were his, and that he had used one of the 
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inject what he thought was methamphetamine. (Tr., Mar. 1 p.31, 
Ls.1 
According to the district court, Mr. Smith had not been his Miranda rights. 
(Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.66, L.14; see Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.31, Ls.4-10.) Mr. Smith had not 
been before or after the questioning, but was allowed to leave. (Tr., Apr. 1 
2013, p.67, Ls.3-6.) Nonetheless, the district court found that Mr. Smith was being 
detained by the officers during the questioning. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.67, Ls.5-6.) The 
questioning took place in an open space between Mr. Smith's car and the police car, 
and Mr. Smith was not placed in the police car. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.67, Ls.20-21.) 
While there were two officers present, only Officer Cwik questioned him with to 
the issue. (See Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, ) The questioning was about 
drugs, which was not related to the purpose of the stop, but by the time of the 
questioning the officers had an indication of possible criminal activity involving drugs. 
(Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.67, Ls.6-12.) The questioning only lasted for a few minutes. 
(Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.68, Ls.1-2.) Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances, the 
district court found that Mr. Smith had not been in custody for purposes of requiring a 
Miranda warning at the time of the questioning. (Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.68, Ls.4-7.) 
However, Mr. Smith was actually in custody 
"[A]n individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the 
right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation." 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966). "[T]he prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation 
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 466. 
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"Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on 
a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody."' Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 
495 (1977) (per curiam). "Custody," as used in Miranda case law, "specifies 
circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion." 
Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). 
To determine whether a person is in custody, the first step "is to ascertain 
whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person 
would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." Id. 
(alternation, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). In this first step, the court 
"must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The factors relevant to examining the totality of the 
circumstances are: the location, timing, and length of the interview; the nature and tone 
of the questioning; whether the defendant came to the place of questioning voluntarily; 
the use of physical contact or physical restraint; and the demeanor of all of the key 
players. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 118 (1995). In the second step of the 
custody analysis, the court must ask "whether the relevant environment presents the 
same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in 
Miranda." Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1189. 
"Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of 
Miranda." Id. For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that, generally, 
a person detained as a result of a traffic stop is not in Miranda custody because the 
traffic stop does not "sufficiently impair [the detained person's] free exercise of his 
privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional 
rights." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984). However, "If a motorist who 
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has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that 
renders him 'in custody' for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of 
protections prescribed by Miranda." Id. at 440 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Although Mr. Smith had been detained pursuant to a traffic stop, he was still 
entitled to Miranda protections because he had been subjected to treatment that 
rendered him in custody for practical purposes. A reasonable person in Mr. Smith's 
position would not have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. See Howes, 
132 S. Ct. at 1189. While the officers ultimately did not arrest Mr. Smith, Officer Cwik 
could not recall returning Mr. Smith's identification to him. (See Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.55, 
Ls.17-19.) Further, unlike a typical traffic stop, Mr. Smith's detention occurred at around 
2:30 in the morning (see Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.10, L.17 - p.11, L.17), meaning that it was 
unlikely that the public would witness the interaction between Mr. Smith and the officers 
and thereby help safeguard Mr. Smith's rights. Cf. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438 ("[T]he 
typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. Passersby, on foot or in other cars, 
witness the interaction of officer and motorist. This exposure to public view both 
reduces the ability of an unscrupulous policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-
incriminating statements and diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does not 
cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse."). Additionally, the subject of inquiry for the 
questioning was possible criminal activity concerning drugs, not the traffic violation that 
was the original reason for the traffic stop. (See Tr., Mar. 4, 2013, p.31, Ls.4-14.) 
Thus, this stop was not a typical traffic stop, and Mr. Smith was in custody for 
purposes of Miranda. Even though Mr. Smith had not been arrested, handcuffed, or 
placed in a police car, there were only two officers present, and the questioning only 
took a few minutes (see Tr., Apr. 19, 2013, p.67, L.3 - p.68, L.3), the totality of the 
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circumstances indicates that Mr. Smith's freedom of movement had been restrained to a 
degree associated with formal arrest. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440. Because 
Mr. Smith was not given Miranda warnings despite being in custody, his statements in 
response to Officer Cwik's questioning about the items found in the canister should be 
suppressed. The district court should have granted Mr. Smith's motion to suppress. 
In short, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Smith's motion to suppress in 
the possession case. The traffic stop was unlawfully extended. Officer Cwik did not 
have justification to perform the Terry frisk on the jacket, and even were he justified, the 
removal of the canister from the sock exceeded the scope of the Terry frisk. Because 
Mr. Smith was not given Miranda warnings despite being in custody, his statements in 
response to Officer Cwik's questioning about the items in the canister should be 
suppressed. Mr. Smith's judgment of conviction in the possession case should be 
vacated, the district court's denial of the motion to suppress should be reversed, and the 
possession case should be remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
11. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Smith's Motion To Suppress In The 
Aggravated Assault Case, Because The Warrantless Blood Draw Violated The 
Fourth Amendment 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Smith asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress in the aggravated assault case, because the warrantless blood draw violated 
the Fourth Amendment. 10 Based on Idaho case law on implied consent, the district 
court denied the motion to suppress. (Tr., May 31, 2013, p.46, L.16 - p.47, L.20.) 
10 The Idaho Supreme Court is considering similar issues in two pending appeals: 
State v. Halseth, Supreme Court Docket No. 41169, and State v. Wulff, Supreme Court 
Docket No. 41179. 
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However, implied consent alone does not justify a warrantless blood draw. Under the 
totality of the circumstances, Mr. Smith did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw. 
Because Mr. Smith did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw, the officers needed a 
warrant before they could perform the blood draw. The officers did not get a warrant, 
and the involuntary blood draw therefore violated Mr. Smith's constitutional rights. 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
As explained above in Part I, when reviewing an order granting or denying a 
motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court defers to the district court's factual 
findings unless clearly erroneous, and exercises free review over the district court's 
determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of 
the facts found. Donato, 135 Idaho at 470. 
A blood draw constitutes a search and seizure of a person under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Halen v. State, 136 
Idaho 829, 833 (2002). As previously discussed, the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 17 guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 17. A search or seizure conducted without 
a warrant is presumptively unreasonable. LaMay, 140 Idaho at 837-38. To overcome 
the presumption, the State bears the burden of showing that (1) the warrantless search 
or seizure fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) the 
search or seizure was reasonable in light of all of the surrounding circumstances. Id. 
at 838. 
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Halen, 136 Idaho at 833. The 
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State has the burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given. 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 
(1968)). "[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of 
duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the 
totality of all the circumstances." Id. at 227. 
C. The Warrantless Blood Draw Violated The Fourth Amendment Because 
Mr. Smith Did Not Voluntarily Consent To The Blood Draw Under The Totality Of 
The Circumstances 
Mr. Smith asserts that the warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth 
Amendment because he did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw. Under the 
totality of the circumstances, Mr. Smith did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw. 
Because Mr. Smith did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw, the officers needed a 
warrant before they could perform the blood draw. The officers did not get a warrant, 
and the involuntary blood draw therefore violated Mr. Smith's constitutional rights 
Here, the parties stipulated that Mr. Smith did not consent to the warrantless 
blood draw unless there was implied consent. (Tr., May 31, 2013, p.40, Ls.5-14.) 
Idaho's implied consent statute provides that "any person who drives or is in actual 
physical control" of a vehicle on an Idaho road impliedly consents to evidentiary testing 
for alcohol, if an officer has reasonable grounds to suspect the person of driving under 
the influence. I.C. § 18-8002(1 ). This implied consent extends to testing the person's 
blood. I.C. § 18-8002(9). 
As the district court suggested (see Tr., May 31, 2013, p.46, L.16- p.47, L.11), 
Idaho case law creates a per se implied consent exception to the warrant requirement 
for blood draws on Idaho motorists. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, because a 
driver "had already given his implied consent to evidentiary testing by driving on an 
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Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw." State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 
303 (2007). The Court reached this holding despite the driver's continued protests to 
the blood draw. See id. at 301. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals subsequently held, in a case involving a blood draw 
where the defendant was unconscious at the time of the blood draw, that, "Even if the 
officer did not notify the defendant of the consequences of the refusal as required by 
I.C. § 18-8002(3), the results of the evidentiary test are admissible in a criminal 
prosecution." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). The DeWitt Court 
reasoned that "[i]nforming a suspect about the consequences of refusing an evidentiary 
test is not intended to be an opportunity for a defendant to withdraw his consent; rather, 
it is an administrative tool designed to increase the likelihood that the suspect will 
peaceably submit to testing that he has no legal right to refuse." Id. 
Later, the Idaho Court of Appeals, in a case involving the question of whether a 
driver may revoke his implied consent to a blood draw, held that "a protest to a blood 
draw does not invalidate consent crated by a person's actions and statute." State v. 
Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 370 (Ct. App. 2010). The Wheeler Court reached this 
conclusion in view of Diaz, where "the Court found that the defendant gave his consent 
to a blood draw by driving in Idaho, despite his repeated protests." Id. (citing Diaz, 144 
Idaho at 302-03). 
Thus, Idaho case law creates a per se implied consent exception to the warrant 
requirement for blood draws on Idaho motorists. However, the United States Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), 
has called into question such per se exceptions to the warrant requirement. In 
McNeely, the Court held that "the metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream" does not 
29 
present "a per se exigency that justified an exception to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases," but that 
"exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the 
circumstances." Id. at 133 S. Ct. at 1556. 
The McNeely Court recognized that the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement "applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of 
law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). "To determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that 
justified acting without a warrant, this Couti looks to the totality of the circumstances." 
Id. at __ , 133 S. Ct. at 1559. The Court then rejected a per se exigent circumstances 
exception for blood draws in drunk driving cases: "In those drunk-driving investigations 
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be 
drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth 
Amendment mandates that they do so." Id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 1560-61. "[W]hile the 
natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific 
case ... it does not do so categorically. Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-
driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of 
the circumstances." Id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 1563. Thus, the McNeely Court rejected a 
per se exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for blood draws on 
drunk-driving suspects. 
While McNeely dealt with the exigent circumstances exception rather than the 
consent exception to the warrant requirement, it calls into question Idaho's per se 
implied consent exception. Just as a court looks at the totality of the circumstances to 
30 
determine whether the exigent circumstances exception applies, McNeely, 569 U.S. at 
__ , ·133 S. Ct. at 1556, a court looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine 
whether consent was voluntary to satisfy the consent exception. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 227. Under the totality of the circumstances analysis for exigent circumstances, the 
McNeely Court observed that "the State based its case on an insistence that a driver 
who declines to submit to testing after being arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol is always subject to a nonconsensual blood test without any precondition for a 
warrant. That is incorrect." McNeely, 569 U.S. at __ , 133 S. Ct. at 1568. Rather, "the 
metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream and the ensuing loss of evidence" were 
only "among the factors that must be considered in deciding whether a warrant is 
required." Id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 1568. The consent exception uses a similar totality 
of the circumstances analysis, indicating that a per se implied consent exception does 
not pass muster after McNeely. 
The United States Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in a per se implied consent 
exception case further undermines Idaho's per se implied consent exception. In 
Aviles v. State, 385 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012), cert. granted, Aviles v. Texas, 
134 S. Ct. 902 (2014), the Texas Court of Appeals held that an officer was authorized to 
require a blood draw from a driver under the Texas implied consent statute. Aviles v. 
State, 385 S.W.3d at 116. The Texas implied consent statute provided that, if a person 
suspected of drunk driving "refuses to provide a specimen voluntarily and the arresting 
officer has credible information that the suspect has been previously convicted twice of 
[Driving While Intoxicated], then the officer 'shall require the taking of a specimen of the 
person's breath or blood .... "' Id. at 116 (citing Tex. Transp. Code§ 724.012(b)(3)(C)). 
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that 




, the Court of Appeals held 
was conducted according to the 
prescriptions of the Transportation Code, and without violating Aviles's Fourth 
Amendment rights." Id. But the United "d"""" Supreme Court subsequently granted the 
defendant's petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case 
"for further consideration in light of Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 
185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013)." Aviles v. Texas, 134 S. Ct. at 902. Because it suggests that 
per se implied consent exceptions to the warrant requirement are not valid after 
McNeely, the grant of certiorari in Aviles further undermines Idaho's per se implied 
consent exception. 
Additionally, even if Mr. Smith gave implied consent to a blood draw, he was 
permitted to withdraw his implied consent. Generally, a person may withdraw their prior 
consent to a search or seizure. generally Richard Henry Seamon, The U.S. 
Supreme Court Sidetracks Idaho's Implied Consent Law, 57 The Advocate, Official 
Publication of the Idaho State Bar, Jan. 2014 at 54. As noted by Professor Seamon, id. 
at 57 & n.22, Idaho's appellate courts have acknowledged that a person may withdraw 
consent in other contexts. See State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154 (Ct. App. 2004) 
("When a police officer is in a private residence solely pursuant to a resident's consent, 
the officer must respect a revocation of that consent."); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 
560 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding, in the context of a home search, that "[e]ven if consent 
has been given, expressly or impliedly, it may be revoked, thereby terminating the 
authority of the police to continue a warrantless search"); see also State v. Hansen, 138 
Idaho 791, 796 (2003) (observing, in the context of a search of a bus used as a 
residence, that the defendant "placed limitations on where and how the ISP officers 
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could search" and the officers "advised him that he could terminate his consent at 
any time"). 
Thus, under the totality of the circumstances in this case, Mr. Smith did not 
voluntarily consent to the blood draw. As the parties stipulated, Mr. Smith did not 
consent to the blood draw unless there was implied consent. (Tr., May 31, 2013, p.40, 
Ls.5-14.) McNeely indicates that Idaho's implied consent statute does not create a per 
se implied consent exception to the warrant requirement. See Aviles v. Texas, 134 S. 
Ct. at 902. A holding that Mr. Smith voluntarily consented under the totality of the 
circumstances here, where the only factor in favor of voluntariness is the implied 
consent statute, would go against McNeely and its rejection of per se exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 1556; Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 227. Under the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Smith did not voluntarily 
consent to the blood draw. 
Because Mr. Smith did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw, the officers 
needed a warrant before they could order the blood draw. See LaMay, 140 Idaho at 
837-38. The officers did not get a warrant (see Tr., May 31, 2013, p.40, Ls.5-9), and the 
involuntary blood draw therefore violated Mr. Smith's constitutional rights. See LaMay, 
140 Idaho at 837-38. Thus, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Smith's motion to 
suppress in the aggravated assault case. The judgment of conviction in the aggravated 
assault case should be vacated with respect to the driving under the influence charge, 
the order denying the motion to suppress should be reversed, and that portion of the 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Smith's ~,Aotion In Limine In 
The Aggravated Assault Case And Permitted The State To Impeach His Credibility With 
His Prior Conviction For Burglary 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Smith asserts that the district court abused its d when it denied his 
motion in limine in the aggravated assault case and permitted the State to impeach his 
credibility with his prior conviction for burglary, because the district court did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards. The district court did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards because it did not weigh the probative 
value of the evidence of the prior conviction against its unfair prejudicial 
In his Motion in Limine, Mr. Smith asserted that his 2000 Washington State 
conviction for first degree burglary was inadmissible "because the nature of the 
conviction is not relevant to the witness's credibility and the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact." (41661 R., p.142.) The 
district court denied the motion in limine with respect to the burglary conviction, 
permitting the State to impeach Mr. Smith's credibility with the burglary conviction. (See 
41661 R., p.167.) At the motion in limine hearing, the district court reasoned: 
With respect to the burglary conviction, it's interesting we've got the 
conviction being back in [2000], but obviously his release from 
confinement is being within the ten-year period [of Rule 609(b)], and I 
think that is the correct reading of the rule is it's whichever is later. So the 
ten-year provision of the rule is not applicable, in my estimation. 
Burglary is within the second category [of crimes as outlined in 
State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573 (1981)], which is - it's all discretionary with 
me, but the conviction for burglary does weigh on credibility. 
So given the fact it is within the ten-year period - I initially thought it 
was not until I find out he has been in custody longer than that - and the 
fact that it can bear on credibility, I'm going to deny the motion in limine 
with respect to the burglary conviction. 
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(Tr., 1 2013, p.26, L.20 p.27, L.10.) The district court Mr. 
conviction was within the period on the certified judgment and conviction 
for the burglary, which indicated that he served 67 months in prison and was 
around 2005. (See Tr., May 13, 2013, p.21, Ls.4-17.) 
During the trial, the State opened its cross-examination of Mr. Smith by asking if 
Mr. Smith was a convicted felon, to which he replied yes. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.238, 
Ls.21-22.) On redirect examination, Mr. Smith testified that he had been convicted of 
burglary in 2000. (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, p.289, Ls.3-7.) 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
An court reviews a trial court's determination on whether is 
relevant under a de nova standard. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho , 30 (1997). The 
appellate court reviews the trial court's determination of whether the probative value 
evidence of a prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Id. at 31. When reviewing a trial court's discretionary decision, an 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry into (1) whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the trial court acted within the 
outer bounds of such discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to 
specific choices, and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609, which governs impeachment of witnesses by 
evidence of conviction of crimes, provides in relevant part: 
For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of the 
fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the nature of the 
felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public 
record, but only if the court determines in a hearing outside the presence 
of the jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the nature of the prior 
conviction, or both, are relevant to the credibility of the witness and that 
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the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the party offering the witness. 
I.RE. 609(a).11 "Thus, two questions must be answered in determining whether 
evidence of a prior conviction should be admitted: (1) whether the evidence is relevant 
to the credibility of the witness; and (2) whether the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs the unfair prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness." Bush, 131 
Idaho at 30; State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 789 (Ct. App. 2012). 
C. The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards, 
Because It Did Not Weigh The Probative Value Of The Evidence Of The Prior 
Conviction Against Its Unfair Prejudicial Effect 
Mr. Smith asserts that the district court did not act consistently with the appiicable 
legal standards when it denied his motion in limine on the burglary conviction, because 
the district court did not weigh the probative value of the evidence of the prior conviction 
against its unfair prejudicial effect. 
By stating that the burglary conviction "does weigh on credibility" (Tr., May 13, 
2013, p.27, Ls.2-4 ), the district court determined that the prior conviction was relevant. 
See Bush, 131 Idaho at 30-31. The district court determined that the burglary 
conviction was relevant in light of State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573 (1981 ). ( See 
Tr., May 13, 2013, p.22, L.25 - p.23, L.5, p.27, Ls.2-8.) In Ybarra, the Idaho Supreme 
11 Rule 609(a) further provides: "If the evidence of the fact of a prior felony conviction, 
but not the nature of the conviction, is admitted for the purpose of impeachment of a 
party to the action or proceeding, the party shall have the option to present evidence of 
the nature of the conviction, but evidence of the circumstances of the conviction shall 
not be admissible." I.RE. 609(a). 
If a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the later of the date of the 
conviction or the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for the 
conviction, evidence of a conviction is not admissible under Rule 609 "unless the court 
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction 
supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial 
effect." 1.R.E. 609(b). 
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held that "a crime such burglary can relevant to credibility." 1 
1. While was not in the first category of felonies, such as perjury, 
that are intimately connected with credibility, or in the third category of acts of violence 
that generally have little or no direct bearing on credibility, burglary was within the 
second of crimes that could be relevant to credibility. Id. 580-81. 
But the relevancy determination by the district court in this case was only half of 
the required Rule 609 analysis. To determine whether evidence of a prior conviction 
should be admitted, a trial court must both determine whether the evidence is relevant 
to the credibility of the witness, and whether the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs the unfair prejudicial to the party offering the witness. Bush, 131 Idaho 
at 30; Grist, 1 Idaho at 
Here, the district court did not determine whether the probative value of the 
evidence of Mr. Smith's prior conviction outweighed the unfair prejudicial effect to 
Mr. Smith. At the motion in limine hearing, Mr. Smith asserted that the burglary 
conviction's "probative value is not outweighed by the extreme prejudice it would have 
on Mr. Smith to go into this conviction." (Tr., May 13, 2013, p.26, Ls.9-11.) But as 
quoted above, the district court gave only two reasons for denying the motion in limine 
on the burglary conviction: (1) the conviction was "within the ten-year period" for 
purposes of Rule 609(b) because Mr. Smith had been released around 2005; and 
(2) "the fact that [burglary] can bear on credibility." (Tr., May 13, 2013, p.27, Ls.5-10.) 
Thus, the district court did not weigh the probative value of the prior conviction evidence 
against its unfair prejudicial effect. (See Tr., May 13, 2013, p.26, L.20- p.27, L.10.) 
Because the district court did not determine whether the probative value of the 
evidence of Mr. Smith's prior conviction outweighed the unfair prejudicial effect to 
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Mr. Smith, it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. See Bush, 131 
Idaho at 30; Grist, 152 Idaho at 789. Thus, because the district court did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards, it abused its discretion when it denied 
Mr. Smith's motion in limine on the burglary conviction. See Hedger, ·115 Idaho at 600. 
D. The State Will Be Unable To Show That The Error Is Harmless 
Mr. Smith further asserts that the State will be unable to show that the district 
court's error in denying the motion in limine on the burglary conviction is harmless. 
"In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court will grant relief 
on appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties." State v. 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363 (2010). "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. "If a 
substantial right is not affected, an abuse of discretion may be deemed harmless." 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "In Idaho, the harmless error test 
established in [Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 (1967)] is now applied to all 
objected-to-error." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010). Pursuant to Chapman, 
once a defendant establishes that an objected-to error occurred, "the State shall have 
the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 
at 222. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently held that "[t]o meet that burden," in the 
context of a case involving the question of whether the improper admission of evidence 
during a jury trial was harmless error, "the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." State v. Joy, 155 
Idaho 1, 11 (2013). 'To say that an error did not 'contribute' to the ensuing verdict is 
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not, of course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial later 
held to have been erroneous." Id. (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991 )). 
"To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error 
unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, 
as revealed in the record." Id. (quoting Yates, 500 U.S. at 403). 'Thus, an appellate 
court's inquiry 'is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict 
would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this 
trial was surely unattributable to the error." Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275,279 (1993)) (emphasis in original). 
Generally, "to raise on appeal a claim of error in an I.R.E. 609 ruling that would 
permit impeachment of a defendant with a prior conviction, the defendant must present 
his testimony." State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 360 (Ct. App. 2007). Because 
Mr. Smith presented his testimony during the trial (Tr., Oct. 2, 2013, pp.208-89), he 
preserved the Rule 609 issue for appeal. Thus, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the jury's verdict. 
See Joy, 155 Idaho at 11. 
The State will be unable to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the district court's error in denying the motion in limine on the burglary 
conviction did not contribute to the jury's verdict. As Mr. Smith asserted before the 
district court (e.g., Tr., May 13, 2013, p.26, Ls.3-11 ), the burglary conviction had low 
probative value and high unfairly prejudicial effect. When weighing the probative value 
of a defendant's prior felony conviction against its prejudicial effect, courts consider 
several factors: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the remoteness of the 
prior conviction, (3) the witness's criminal history, (4) the similarity between the past 
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crime and the crime charged, (5) the importance of the witness's testimony, (6) the 
centrality of the credibility issue, and (7) the nature and extent of the witness's criminal 
record as a whole. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 633 (1999); Grist, 152 Idaho 
at 790. 
Based on the above factors, the prior conviction here had low probative value 
and high unfairly prejudicial effect. Mr. Smith's burglary conviction happened in 2000 
(Tr., May 13, 2013, p.18, Ls.15-16), while the alleged offenses in the aggravated assault 
case were said to have occurred in September 2012 (41661 R., pp.98-99). Thus, the 
remoteness of the prior conviction weighs against its probative value. See Thompson, 
132 Idaho at 633; Grist, 152 Idaho at 790. Further, there is little similarity between the 
past burglary and the alleged crimes of violence or drug crimes charged in the 
aggravated assault case. (See Tr., May 13, 2013, p.18, L.23 - p.19, L.5.) The 
dissimilarities between the past crime and the crimes charged also weigh against the 
burglary conviction's probative value. See Thompson, 132 Idaho at 633; Grist, 152 
Idaho at 790. Additionally, the centrality of the credibility issue weighs against the 
probative value because, as Mr. Smith's counsel explained during the motion in limine 
hearing, "Mr. Smith is going to tell his side of the story and what he perceived 
happened. And the State's obviously going to put on evidence of what they believe 
happened and their story." (See Tr., May 13, 2013, p.19, Ls.9-18.) 
The burglary conviction had low probative value and high unfairly prejudicial 
effect. Thus, it cannot be said that the error in permitting impeachment on the burglary 
conviction was unimportant, or that the guilty verdict was unattributable to the error. 
See Joy, 155 Idaho at 11. The State will be unable to meet its burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error is harmless. 
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the district court did not whether the probative value of the 
of Mr. Smith's prior conviction the 41 unfair prejudicial 
Mr. Smith, it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. Thus, the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Smith's motion limine on the 
burglary conviction. The State will be unable to meet its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the district court's error is harmless. The district court's error is 
reversible, and the rest of Mr. Smith's judgment of conviction in the aggravated assault 
case (the driving under the influence charge should be vacated as discussed above in 
Part II) should be vacated and his case should remanded for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
judgment of conviction in the possession case, reverse the district court's denial of the 
motion to suppress, and remand the possession case to the district court for further 
proceedings. Mr. Smith also respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction in the aggravated assault case with respect to the driving under the influence 
charge, reverse the order denying the motion to suppress should be reversed, and 
remand that potiion of the aggravated assault case to the district court for 
further proceedings. Further, Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
rest of the judgment of conviction in the aggravated assault case and remand his case 
for a new trial. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 2014. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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